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Abstract
This article explores the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees’ (UNRWA) responses to the US
Government’s decision to dramatically cut its financial contributions to the Agency in 2018. Acknowledging the
complexities of the fast-moving changes and dilemmas faced by UNRWA and Palestinian refugees, this article
focuses specifically on the events that unfolded in the first six months of 2018. Through a multiscalar analysis, I
start by situating UNRWA’s key responses as they have played out on the international stage through a high-
profile fundraising campaign (#DignityIsPriceless). I then develop a close reading of three regional-level UNRWA
circulars disseminated to UNRWA staff pertaining to the provision of maternal and neonatal health services, and
to Palestinian UNRWA staff members’ employment and pension rights. Against the backdrop of the impact of
UNRWA’s responses across the region, I subsequently examine how these operational changes have been
experienced and conceptualised by Palestinians living in refugee camps in Lebanon, noting that those
experiences must be analysed within the broader context of protracted displacement, enforced immobility and
overlapping displacement.
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Introduction
With the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees (UNRWA) having run a deficit almost since the
start of its operations in 1950, the US’s decision – as
UNRWA’s erstwhile primary funder – to cut its financial
support for the Agency is having a significant impact
both on UNRWA and over five million Palestinian
refugees living across UNRWA’s five areas of operation
in the Middle East: Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Gaza and the
West Bank. This article explores UNRWA’s responses to
this dramatic cut in funding; more specifically, it
examines the ways UNRWA’s operational changes since
January 2018 have been experienced and conceptualised
by Palestinians living in Lebanon. It does so through a
multiscalar analysis, tracing and examining processes
taking place in the international arena, on regional and
national levels in the Middle East and within the
Palestinian refugee camps of Lebanon.1
In January 2018, the US Government declared that it
would contribute only $60 million to UNRWA (com-
pared to $364 million the previous year)2 unless the
Agency undertook specific US-approved ‘reforms’.3 This
‘catastrophic’ decision (AFP, 2018) was widely
denounced around the world as a form of collective
punishment against the Palestinian people (Bachner,
2018; Dumper, 2018). By the end of August 2018, when
the US Government announced its decision to
completely defund UNRWA, commentators identified
this as part of a strategy to force Palestinian refugees to
rescind the Right of Return to Palestine (a right set out in
UNGA Resolution 194).4 Many noted that undermining
the Agency’s capacity to deliver relief and services would
create such abject living conditions (akin to Agamben’s
‘bare life’: Gordon, 2018) that Palestinians would be
forced to accept what Trump and his administration
have denominated the ‘deal of the century’ (Gordon,
2018; Wong, 2018). Far from being motivated by an
‘ethics of care’ to protect displaced and dispossessed
people, or a quest to secure a democratically grounded
‘liberal peace’, this ‘great deal’ can be identified as a
quintessentially neoliberal project. Driven neither by
ethics nor humanitarian principles, this is an approach
underpinned by the depoliticisation of the cause of
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Palestinians’ displacement and dispossession – the
occupation of Palestinian territory by the state of
Israel. In essence, the deal is a ‘truly Trumpian
solution’: ‘cash for peace instead of land for peace…
Peace will therefore be economic, rather than political…
Their hopes may be dead but their bank accounts will be
in the black’ (Fisk, 2018).
While UNRWA may be perceived as being at parti-
cular risk due to the financial precarity resulting from the
funding cuts, it is (as I explore below) Palestinians
who continue to bear the manifold risks created and
perpetuated by diverse actors – including states and
UN agencies.
As a means of laying the foundations for the
subsequent analysis of UNRWA’s responses to themajor
financial shortfall arising in January 2018, in the first
section of the article I start by providing a brief overview
of the history of UNRWA supporting Palestinian
refugees in theMiddle East since the 1950s. In presenting
this historical reflection, I start from the premise that the
current processes must be analysed in relation to
UNRWA’s long-standing financial insecurity and the
extent to which the Agency has repeatedly ‘shrunk’ the
group of Palestinian refugees considered to be a priority
in addition to the nature of services it has been willing or
able to deliver to these selected recipients.
In the second section, I trace the contours of the
#DignityIsPriceless campaign launched by UNRWA in
January 2018. I focus on this campaign given its
hypervisibility in the international public sphere as
UNRWA’s official response to the cuts and its acute
financial crisis, while acknowledging that other inter-
national responses, such as bilateral and multilateral
discussions between UNRWA and potential donors and
various diplomats, have been ongoing throughout this
period. Understandably, given UNRWA’s financial cir-
cumstances following the announcement of the cuts, the
campaign sought to encourage existing and ‘non-
traditional’ state and non-state actors to commit funds
to ensure that the rights and needs of Palestinian refugees
were met. By examining the representational strategies
used in this campaign, I outline how it simultaneously
highlights the vulnerability and ‘worthiness’ of certain
groups of Palestinian refugees (a well-worn, and equally
critiqued, fundraising strategy) while also centralising
certain Palestinians’ agency and rights. Considering hyper-
visibility and invisibility (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2016a),
I argue that the international campaign’s celebration
of specific groups of Palestinian refugees and its
prioritisation of communication with international
audiences simultaneously dismisses the roles and
rights of diverse groups of Palestinians in the Middle
East. Equally, it veils the adverse effects of UNRWA’s
own regional and local-level operational processes on a
wide range of people, including UNRWA’s Palestinian
staff members.
I demonstrate this, firstly, by developing a close textual
analysis of three regional-level UNRWA circulars dis-
seminated to UNRWA staff in early 2018. Several of my
interviewees in Lebanon shared the full text of these
circulars with me, showing me the circulars they had
received by email from UNRWA on their mobile phones
and/or laptops; all quotes from the circulars are taken
verbatim from the documents on file with the author. In
undertaking this close reading of the documents, I trace
the nature and implications of a series of UNRWA’s more
‘private’ responses to the 2018 cuts, with a particular
focus on shifts in educational and maternal and neonatal
health services on the one hand and employment and
pension rights on the other. I thus illustrate the extent to
which UNRWA’s operational changes are invisible on the
international stage and yet are having significant impacts
on Palestinian refugees’ access to services and diverse
rights on regional and local levels.
I subsequently examine how these operational changes
were experienced by Palestinians living in refugee camps
in Lebanon in the first half of 2018, noting that those
experiences must be analysed within the broader context
of protracted displacement, enforced immobility and
experiences of overlapping displacement (Fiddian-
Qasmiyeh, 2015, 2016b). In the case of Lebanon, this
requires acknowledging the impacts of operational
changes both on the ‘established’ 450,000 registered
Palestinian refugees who have resided in Lebanon since
1948 (primarily living in twelve official refugee camps
and numerous informal gatherings in that country) and
on the ‘more recently arrived’ 31,000 Palestinian refugees
from Syria who have sought safety in Lebanon since 2011
from the ongoing Syrian conflict. Palestinian refugees
from Syria (PRS) in Lebanon are considered by UNRWA
to be a particularly vulnerable group – 90 per cent are
living under the poverty line and 95 per cent are food-
insecure – and are primarily being ‘hosted’ in established
Palestinian camps which are themselves characterised by
chronic poverty, insecurity, marginalisation and
exclusion (UNRWA, 2017b). As noted by UNRWA,
even before the arrival of tens of thousands of
Palestinians displaced from Syria, ‘Among the five
UNRWA fields, Lebanon has the highest percentage of
Palestine refugees living in abject poverty’ (UNRWA, n.
d.b). Since then, ‘The influx of Palestine refugees from
the Syrian Arab Republic has aggravated the dependency
situation of the community… In this context, the
Agency’s services are seen as a lifeline for the refugees’
(UNGA WG, 2016).5
To examine the implications of UNRWA’s operational
shifts in such a context, I build upon my long-standing
ethnographic research in and about the Palestinian
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refugee camps in Lebanon and insights from an ongoing
research project examining how the members of nine
local communities – including Palestinian refugee com-
munities – in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey have been
responding to the arrival and presence of refugees from
Syria.6 As part of this project, between January and June
2018 I conducted semi-structured interviews in Lebanon
with ten Palestinians with the aim of exploring the
impacts of UNRWA’s responses to the recent cuts on
their own lives and those of their communities. In order
to protect interviewees’ anonymity, certain personal
identifiers have been changed and the precise location
of interviews excluded.
On a conceptual level, my analysis is framed around
two dichotomies – hypervisibility and invisibility on the
one hand and the public and the private on the other – in
turn building upon existing literature on humanitarian
campaigns and critiques of neoliberal approaches to
refugee situations. With regards to the latter, it is
important to start by acknowledging that humanitarian
agencies around the world are facing cumulative funding
reductions and a concomitant drive to diversify
their donors. Simultaneously, donors and agencies alike
are promoting greater degrees of ‘localisation’ –
supporting the roles played by regional, national and
local actors in affected regions – and ‘self-reliance’
amongst refugee communities. Indeed, in many ways,
the above-mentioned deal echoes this increasing deter-
mination to promote, or even acquire, the ‘self-reliance’
of refugees.
As I have discussed elsewhere (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh,
2015), as a programmatic approach and as a key
‘indicator’ of successful outcomes, ‘self-reliance’ has
been defined by the UN High Commission for Refugees
(UNHCR) as referring ‘to developing and strengthening
livelihoods of persons of concern, and reducing their
vulnerability and long-term reliance on humanitarian or
external assistance’ (UNHCR, 2006b: 1; 2011:15);
elsewhere, UNHCR defines ‘self-reliance’ much more
narrowly as ‘providing… a professional qualification
geared towards future employment’ (UNHCR, 2007: 7,
emphasis added). While frequently extolled as a key way
of ‘empowering’ refugees and recognising their ‘agency’,
self-reliance programmes have been criticised for
providing ways for donors and states to evade their
responsibilities towards refugees and a justification to
perpetuate structural inequalities that create and
maintain particular forms of vulnerability and risk in
protracted displacement.7 Critiques of ‘self-reliance’ are
relevant in many ways when examining both the US’s
decision to defund UNRWA, and UNRWA’s operational
responses to these cuts.
Firstly, UNRWA has, to an extent, ensured the ‘self-
reliance’ of tens of thousands of Palestinians since it is an
agency that both provides services and assistance
and employs 30,000 Palestinian refugees who work full-
time to support other members of their community
(UNRWA, 2016). These employees embody the potential
for a form of multiscalar ‘mutual self-reliance’ or
‘collective self-sufficiency’ – this is to say that UNRWA
employees have not only aimed to achieve a degree of
‘self-reliance’ on an individual and family level (as per
UNHCR’s definition above) but have also acted as peer
providers of assistance and services for communities
across the region (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2011, 2015). At a
time when ‘self-reliance’ and job creation are being
extensively promoted as the key, apolitical and status-
quo-maintaining solutions to refugee situations in
settings that include Palestine and the ‘special economic
zones’ of Jordan, it may appear ironic that ‘one of the
largest employers of Palestine refugees’ (UNRWA,
2016: 48) is being targeted for ‘disruption’ by the
US Administration.
However, rather than a total disjuncture between ‘the
great deal’ and UNRWA’s employment practices, some
(uncomfortable) continuities can be identified between
them: UNRWAhas provided tens of thousands of jobs to
Palestinians across the region, while being unable to
secure Palestinians’ political rights, including the collec-
tive/national right to self-determination and the Right of
Return. Indeed, one of the main criticisms levelled by
many Palestinians against UNRWA is that its modus
operandi has arguably enabled many Palestinians –
employees and non-employees alike – to normalise
rather than resist and demand sustainable and effective
alternatives.8 Such alternatives, as long argued by
proponents of the self-determination of Palestine (the
ultimate form of self-sufficiency on a national level),
should prioritise securing a political solution to the
occupation; in the absence of such a solution the
continuation of UNRWA’s mandate and financial
security has remained a priority on international,
regional and local levels alike (UNGA, 2009).
Noting these and other criticisms of UNRWA, this
article pivots around my interviewees’ perceptions and
fears regarding the effect of UNRWA’s 2018 operational
changes that are undermining individual, familial and
collective rights. Although they are invisible on the
international stage and in UNRWA’s #DignityIsPriceless
campaign, a series of increased risks are thus being borne
by Palestinian UNRWA staff whose employment rights
are being undermined both by financial cuts and
operational changes.
Furthermore, a second related way that ‘self-reliance’
is pertinent to this analysis emerges through the
application of an additional lens: the private–public
framework. I use this lens and what I denominate a
process of ‘privatisation’ to denote the ways that30
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operational changes are increasingly rendering Palesti-
nians responsible for the provision of their own welfare
and services – including education and health care –
within the private sphere of their homes and local
communities. The withdrawal and deterioration of
UNRWA services available in the public sphere is
ultimately paralleled by the increasing demand on
Palestinian individuals, families and communities to be
self-sufficient, in spite of the long-standing (and arguably
increasing) precarity of their situations.
UNRWA: A Brief Background
UNRWA was established by UN General Assembly
(UNGA) Resolution 302 (IV) in December 1949, as one
of two UN agencies (the other being the United Nations
Conciliation Commission on Palestine – UNCPP)
mandated to fulfill the international community’s
obligations towards Palestinian refugees displaced and
dispossessed by the partition of Palestine in 1948. The
exclusion of Palestinian refugees from the ‘universal’
refugee regime – the 1950 Statute of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the
1951 Refugee Convention – and the international
community’s failure to secure a political solution to
ensure Palestinian refugees’ Right of Return enshrined in
UNGA Resolution 194, has meant that Palestinians have
remained in a precarious protracted refugee situation
since then. They have been unable to access international
refugee protection, or the durable solutions that the
UNCPP had been mandated to secure for the Palestinian
refugee community (Akram, 2014: 228).
In effect, ‘political impasse, lack of support, and
de-funding by the UN’ led to the UNCPP ‘shrinking’
to such an extent that it disappeared, in spite of never
being legally terminated by the UNGA (ibid.: 229). The
intertwined risks of defunding, institutional shrinking
and potential disappearance continue to pervade Pales-
tinian refugees’ experiences and perceptions of UNRWA
as the remaining UN agency responsible for Palestinians.
UNRWA’s initial three-year mandate as a ‘relief and
works’ agency supporting Palestinian refugees residing
within its five areas of operation has been renewed for
the past seventy years. While continuing to provide
‘works’ and ‘services’ to Palestinian refugees – including
in the fields of health, social services, education, micro-
finance and direct cash emergency programmes – its
budget and programming have been precarious since the
agency’s inception, as has Palestinian refugees’ access to
its services. Funded through fluctuating annual bilateral
donations, donor support ‘has generally failed to keep
pace with the rapid growth of UNRWA’s clientele…
consequently the Agency has faced a worsening financial
crisis’ (Brynen, 2003, 157).9 The cumulative effects of this
ongoing financial crisis meant that by mid-2016,
UNRWA faced ‘a crippling crisis in the form of a $96.5
million funding gap’ (Krähenbühl, 2016). Since then, the
UNGA Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA
has been actively exploring and adopting measures to
strengthen the Agency’s financial situation and ability to
provide essential services (see UNGA WG, 2016); by
December 2017, the situation had ‘improved’ somewhat
when the agency ‘only’ faced an outstanding deficit of
$49 million (Krähenbühl, 2017). Ongoing plans set out
in the UNGA WG paper of August 2016 included
establishing a World Bank Trust Fund for UNRWA,
a waqf endowment fund in support of Palestinian
refugees managed by the Islamic Development Bank,
and (now in place) an endowment fund proposed by the
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation.
In the context of the long-standing financial deficit,
although UNRWA has continued to provide ‘relief and
works’, the actual services provided have been reduced
and the groups of Palestinian refugees entitled to receive
UNRWA services have constantly shrunk over time.
With a current total registered refugee population of
over five million people in the Middle East, ‘UNRWA’s
mandate extends to groups or categories of vulnerable
Palestinian refugees and displaced persons according to
relief or protection criteria’, and – importantly - ‘[i]ts
designated categories and individuals can be dropped
from the rolls or cease to be provided services based on
changed priorities of need and vulnerabilities’ (Akram,
2014: 230, emphasis added). A small selection of such
changes in priorities – implicitly or explicitly linked
to past and ongoing financial crises – is summarised
in Table 1.
The shifts in UNRWA’s strategic and operational
priorities since the announcement of the January 2018
funding crisis explored below – in the areas of maternal
and neonatal services, education and employment –
must be viewed in relation to this long history of
defunding, shrinking services and groups of beneficiaries
and the erosion of different groups of Palestinian
refugees’ access to rights.
The #DignityIsPriceless Campaign
Until recently, the US was ‘the largest bilateral donor to
UNRWA’.10 By the end of 2017, the US had pledged
$157,476,322 to UNRWA’s general programme budget
and an additional $206,789,263 to its non-programme
budget; this included a contribution of $103,300,000 for
UNRWA’s Syria Appeal and $95,000,000 to the
Occupied Palestinian Territories Emergency Appeal.11
Having provided a total of $364million in 2017, Trump’s
announcement in January 2018 that the US would only
contribute $60million that year left an already struggling
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UNRWA to face ‘the most critical financial situation in
the history of the Agency’ (Krähenbühl, 2018a).
On 22 January 2018, UNRWA’s Commissioner-
General, Pierre Krähenbühl, launched an emergency
fundraising campaign. The #DignityIsPriceless cam-
paign (Table 2) aims to mobilise donor states and civil
society worldwide to secure funds to keep open 700
UNRWA schools that educate 525,000 children across
the region and to ensure that UNRWA can continue
providing lifesaving emergency food aid, emergency cash
assistance and essential medical services to millions of
refugees. These include 400,000 Palestinians who remain
at great risk within Syria, almost 1 million people who
entirely rely on UNRWA in Gaza and over 50,000
Palestinian refugees from Syria now living precariously
in Lebanon and Jordan (UNRWA, 2018a).
Following UNRWA’s Rome ExtraordinaryMinisterial
Conference in March 2018 and the UNRWA Pledging
Conference of June 2018, major financial commitments
have been made by UNRWA’s state and non-state
supporters (Krähenbühl, 2018b, c). However, a
significant funding shortfall both for UNRWA’s
standard programming needs and for emergency
campaigns remains. And, indeed, it has long been
recognised that ‘[w]hile donor support for emergency
appeals increases UNRWA’s ability to deliver critical
services, the very launching of such appeals also reflects
new and acute demands being placed on the Agency by
the eruption of violence or other circumstances. In such
cases, increases in donor support may indicate a decline—
rather than an improvement—in UNRWA’s ability
to perform its primary functions’ (Brynen, 2003: 163,
emphasis added).
Even with pledges secured, UNRWA’s ability to
‘perform its primary functions’ and meet Palestinians’
needs and rights in 2018 has been acutely threatened,
and is in significant decline (ibid.). In such a context, it is
unsurprising that many Palestinian refugees have been
asking whose and which rights are being prioritised
through UNRWA’s campaigning and operational shifts.
Indeed, before turning to the operational shifts
implemented since January 2018, it is worth noting that
UNRWA’s #DignityIsPriceless campaign has used
images and text that consistently centralise the needs
and rights of ‘womenandchildren’ (Enloe, 1991). In
particular, the campaign has allocated a central role to
Palestinian refugees as vulnerable people whose bodily
needsmust bemet; this includes through the figure of the
mother(to-be)-and-child, infirm patients and other
‘particularly vulnerable groups’ whose wellbeing and
very lives depend on receiving medical and emergency
cash assistance. At the same time, Palestinian children
and youths have been recognised as actively demanding
that their rights be met – especially as students
demanding their right to an education qua a right to
a future.
Placing the vulnerable ‘womanandchild’ at the fore-
front of current and ongoing fundraising campaigns is
entirely expected, as both women and children – agentic
or otherwise – have historically been positioned as ‘ideal
victims’: as innocent and apolitical beings who are truly
‘worthy’ recipients of humanitarian aid (Malkki, 1996;
Enloe, 1991; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2009). As such, the
centralisation of Palestinian children and youths as
active agents demanding their rights does not mean
that the campaign has offered an effective solution to the
long-standing tendency for humanitarian agencies to32
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Table 2 #Dignity Is Priceless campaign
For 70 years, we stood #ForPalestineRefugees as they endured
injustice and suffering.
1.7 million extremely vulnerable refugees rely on regular food and
cash assistance.
Average of 9 million patient visits to our 150 clinics annually.
Half a million girls and boys attend our 700 schools.
That’s their rights and dignity. And it’s threatened by drastic
funding reductions.
Source: https://donate.unrwa.org.
Table 1 Adapted from Barney’s figure (2003: 183) entitled ‘Examples of Key Strategic and Operations Priorities made by
UNRWA’
Year Operational change implemented Further information on the change
1982 Change: food and relief no longer provided to all
registered refugees
Beneficiaries: relief only provided to ‘special hardship
cases identified by social workers’
Selection criteria:
– no men aged 19–60
– female-headed households
– over-60s
1994 Change: stopped mental health programmes Reason given: mental health programmes no longer considered beneficial
since they are ‘clinical rather than community-based’
1995 Change: stopped supplementary feeding programmes To minimize ‘great hardship’, liaised with other agencies to ensure they will
‘pick up’ cases if necessary
1998 Change: stopped free distribution of prosthetics to all
beneficiaries
Beneficiaries: prosthetic devices restricted to children
and ‘those who need the aids to work’
Impact: no hearing aids/glasses for OAPs
1999 Change: reduction in UNRWA salaries and terms and
conditions
Impact: ‘difficulty in recruiting and keeping hold of quality staff’
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raise funds through invoking pity and compassion.
Instead, recognising Palestinian refugee children
as rights-bearers – even when viewed alongside
the solidarity-infused rhetoric of official UNRWA
statements by non-Palestinian senior staff (see www.
unrwa.org) – embodies a continuation of, rather than an
alternative to, preexisting strategic frames. Furthermore,
by focusing on rights through the figure of the
Palestinian child as a bearer of the right to basic
education and health, this approach also marginalises
the significance of political and legal rights and
perpetuates the depoliticisation of the causes of,
and solutions to, occupation, dispossession and
displacement.
In turn, I argue that the campaign risks drawing
attention away from other major threats being borne by
different groups of Palestinian refugees, including those
that are a result of a series of ‘invisible’ regional and local-
level responses developed by UNRWA. Equally, the
campaign has effectively erased the figure, and rights of,
certain cohorts of Palestinian refugees as active agents
and indeed as providers of services in their capacity as
UNRWA’s Palestinian employees. In the following pages
I thus trace the ways in which locally-circulated and
institutionalised operational changes in the fields of
health, education and employment risk undermining the
rights of both the vulnerable and active figures present in
the official UNRWA campaigns, and of those Palestinian
refugees who are ultimately invisible in the international
arena.
‘Privatising’ Health and Education
in the Palestinian Refugee Camps?
In this part of the article I contribute to debates
pertaining to the promotion of the ‘localisation of aid’
and ‘self-reliance’ amongst refugees through my notion
of the ‘privatisation’ of health and educational services.
Here, I distinguish between ‘the public’ and ‘the private’
to highlight the apparent disjuncture between vocal
assertions being made on the international stage and the
reduction of services on the regional and local level. I also
posit that services for Palestinians are increasingly being
‘privatised’ through their redesignation as activities
which are to be led by Palestinian refugees themselves
within their homes with no externally-provided support,
rather than in public health or educational institutions.
For instance, on 29 March 2018 UNRWA’s Beirut
office issued an internal circular to UNRWA staff in
Lebanon entitled ‘Clarification on the Coverage of
Specific Health Services’. The national-level circular
announced that UNRWA’s limited financial resources
in 2018 mean that the agency ‘finds itself compelled to
suspend the coverage of normal deliveries from normal
pregnancies starting the end of March 2018’. It also
announced the suspension of a copayment system
through which UNRWA covered 10 per cent of ‘the
Secondary Hospitalization bill at public and private
hospitals for Palestine refugees who are registered in
the Social Safety Net program and Palestine refugees
from Syria who are registered in Lebanon’.
By withdrawing these programmes, hospitals and
medical services may continue to run, but the costs to
access these will be prohibitive for many. This is
especially the case since 65 per cent of Palestinians in
Lebanon (PRL) were living under the poverty line by the
end of 2017, only 42 per cent of PRL were estimated to be
economically active, and Palestinians from Syria living in
Lebanon were in acutely precarious conditions (Charles,
2017). The implications of reduced services will
undoubtedly include an increase in the number of
women giving birth at home if they are unable to cover
the approximately $400-$500 USD fee for a normal
delivery in a public hospital (Karas, 2017). As early as
2017, UNRWA’s Health Program had noted that
‘maternal mortality rates remain relatively high’,
acknowledging that ‘[u]nless additional resources
are secured, further reductions will be a challenge’
(UNRWA, 2018b: 10).
Importantly in this circular, UNRWA ‘clarified’ its
announcements through asserting that the programmes
and services that were being suspended in March 2018
had in fact been funded through external donations as
‘additional’ measures, and that these services in fact do
not ‘essentially fall within UNRWA health policy
mandate’. In the case of ‘normal deliveries’, this service
had been funded through additional support provided
from the Qatari Red Crescent and UNICEF from 2011 to
March 2018, with the start of this service clearly
coinciding with the onset of the mass displacement of
refugees from Syria to Lebanon and the acknowledgment
of the particular vulnerabilities that all Palestinians
in Lebanon would be facing as a result. In turn, the
copayment service had been introduced in 2017 as a
‘complementary step to the adjusted hospitalization
policy’ for particularly vulnerable Palestinians living in
Lebanon, with ‘UNRWA finance[ing] this service
outside the Health Program Budget, through contribu-
tions of the Medical Hardship Fund donors’.
By stressing the exceptional and ‘additional’ nature
of these services, and by asserting that UNRWA
has provided these services ‘outside’ of its normal
programmes, UNRWA has effectively interpellated the
cuts in services as a ‘return to normal’, rather than
acknowledging them ‘as’ services being withdrawn.
Simultaneously, it has made an operational decision
to de-prioritise the health needs and rights of
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people – women, children, special hardship cases and
Palestinians from Syria – in communities which are
becoming ever-more vulnerable. As noted above, this is
by virtue of the increasingly protracted nature of the
overlapping displacement of Palestinians from Syria
living in the under-resourced Palestinian camps in
Lebanon which have themselves hosted multiple waves
of displaced people over the past seven decades (Fiddian-
Qasmiyeh, 2016b).
A poignant reminder of how these multiple arrivals
relate to the second set of services explored below –
education – is that, well before the US cuts, UNRWAhad
made a series of operational decisions to enrol PRS
children into existing under-resourced and under-staffed
UNRWA schools in Lebanon rather than creating new
schools or classrooms.12 In North Lebanon, this can be
seen through the case of Al-Mazaar School, which in
2018 hosts the largest number of Palestinian children
from Syria currently living in Baddawi camp. As one of
my interviewees explained:
Al-Mazaar School [alongside Majiddo and Amqa
schools] travelled with the people from Nahr
el-Bared [in North Lebanon, to Baddawi camp]…
It used to be in Nahr el-Bared camp but when the
camp was destroyed [in 2007], and the people
arrived here, schools were built for the children of
Nahr el-Bared and they were given the same names.
When the war from Nahr el-Bared ended, Amqa
school returned to Nahr el-Bared while Majiddo and
Al-Mazaar stayed in Baddawi, both for the children
from Nahr el-Bared who remain here, and also for
the children from Syria who have more recently
arrived.
In essence, Al-Mazaar School is an ‘old’ school reborn in a
‘new’ place, catering for internally displaced Palestinian
refugee children fromNahr el-Bared, who now share their
under-resourced temporary structure with Palestinian
children from Syria living in Baddawi since 2011. The
school may be open, but the children have long been
forced to ‘make do’ with the bare minimum.
It is notable that education has historically been
UNRWA’s top programming and budgetary priority
and yet UNRWA has on several occasions – the most
recent being summer 2015 – been on the brink of having
to postpone or even cancel the start of the UNRWA
school year due to funding crises (UNRWA, 2016). In
this context, it is understandable that difficult
operational decisions have been made for decades in
the field of education, and it is largely unsurprising that
the US funding cuts and UNRWA’s resulting strategic
reorientation are adding further risks to Palestinian
children’s learning. Indeed, even though funds were
finally secured to open UNRWA schools in September
2018, UNRWA has reportedly announced that
Palestinian children will no longer be provided with
UNRWA textbooks free of charge (see Blome Jacobsen
et al., 2003), but will have to purchase these themselves.
While currently justified through reference to the 2018
funding cuts, however, it is important to note that the
imminent withdrawal of free textbooks had already been
announced in summer 2015 during that year’s major
crisis (also see UNRWA, 2016). This highlights the need
to be attentive to the longer history of such threats and
announcements and also the extent to which these may
not necessarily lead to the actual withdrawal of a service,
but may nonetheless be characterised by major
insecurities as families try to determine if they can
afford to continue sending their children to school. It
also raises the question, beyond the scope of this article,
of whether the actual changes that are being introduced
in 2018 are responding to the US Administration’s
funding cut, or part of a broader process of decision
making and planning pre-dating Trump.
Costs associated with school books and other materi-
als will invariably be prohibitive for many, especially
families with multiple school-aged children, and yet this
is only one of many pressures limiting education systems
andmore concretely children’s experiences of school and
learning. For instance, the eight-year-old daughter of one
of my interviewees attends a double-shift UNRWA
school in North Lebanon, where she is one of more than
50 children in her class.13 As an UNRWA science teacher
noted, it is simply not possible for teachers to
meaningfully teach children in such large classes: ‘these
children learn nothing at school – they can only learn if
their parents can help them at home’.14
Learning, as in the case of childbirth, is increasingly
being ‘privatised’, not in the sense of private institutions
providing education or health care, but in the sense
of these processes taking place within the private sphere
of the home, and depending on the skills and knowledge
of family members.15 In essence, the ‘privatisation’ of
health and learning emerges as a prime example of
refugees being expected to fill the gaps created both by
international funding cuts and operational responses to
these. In turn, if relatives do not have these skills,
knowledge, or indeed time or energy, the implications
are exponential.
Indeed, another series of pressures clearly influence
UNRWA’s service provision on the ground, in spite of
their ongoing invisibility in international communica-
tions and fundraising campaigns: it is, amongst other
things, changes in UNRWA’s employment rules that are
leading to larger class sizes and an increase in mistrust
towards UNRWA in its dual position as a service
provider and the employer of tens of thousands of
Palestinians who provide these services.34
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Precarious Workers’ Rights16
In its 2016–2021MediumTermStrategy report,UNRWA
noted that ‘[t]he largest driver of costs – the Agency’s
service delivery and the staff required for that – is also the
Agency’s biggest asset’ (2016: 57). Circa 95 per cent of all
UNRWA employees are Palestinian refugees, with
UNRWA being one of the main employers for Palesti-
nians across the Middle East. Indeed, UNRWA is seen as
having an obligation to employ Palestinians as part of the
effort to uphold their rights; this is particularly important
in contexts where Palestinians are excluded from the
national labour market, as is the case in Lebanon, where
Palestinians are barred from almost all forms of employ-
ment outside of their refugee camp-homes. In January
2018, UNRWA’s Commissioner-General implored:
UNRWA’s full-time 30,000 professional and experi-
enced staff – doctors, nurses, school principals and
teachers, guards and sanitation laborers, social and
psychosocial workers, administrative and support
staff: be at your duty stations to serve the community
with the same dedication and commitment that you
have always shown. This is a moment for internal
cohesion and solidarity. Times are very critical but
we will do our utmost to protect you.
(Krähenbühl, 2018b)
In addition to these full-time employees, due to the
precarious nature of UNRWA’s budget since its incep-
tion in the 1950s, UNRWA has long supplemented the
employment of Palestinian staff on fixed-term and
indefinite contracts with thousands of people employed
on daily contracts for years, and often decades, on end.
These precariously employed ‘dailies’ are called upon on
an ad hoc basis to fill short-term gaps as they arise,
including as substitute teachers and doctors to cover sick
leave.
In 2016, UNRWA announced that it ‘is committed to
being recognized by all stakeholders … as a fair
employer’, an objective that would be reached, inter alia,
by ‘applying the correct remuneration [and] providing
acceptable conditions of service’ (2016: 63, emphasis
added). Irrespective of these aims, many UNRWA
employees – including the Palestinian teachers, guards
and sanitation workers I have been speaking with across
Lebanon – do not believe that UNRWA is committed to
‘protecting’ them at a time when their jobs and futures
are at risk. Indeed, potential redundancies in Lebanon’s
educational vocational centres had already been officially
announced in March 2018 (Cordone, cited in AFP,
2018), and my interviewees had informed me that
throughout the first three months of 2018 dozens of
UNRWA ‘dailies’ have either been made redundant or
have not had their contracts renewed.
Exceptional Measures and Major
Insecurities
Almost two years before the US cuts were announced,
UNRWA had asserted that it was ‘committed to
managing its costs in a way that retains the Agency’s
capacity to achieve the Strategic Outcomes with
maximum impact of its resources and without compro-
mising on essential services’, aiming to ‘produce a greater
quality impact without significant increases in its work-
force’ (2016: 57). At the same, it declared that it would ‘be
able to meet legal obligations to staff and control the
growth in staff numbers in such a way that growth
in staff costs will not exceed 3 per cent per annum’
(2016: 63). Against this pre-existing commitment to
cost-efficiency and maximising the impact of its
(human) resources, UNRWA’s operational policies in
2018 have not only led to the stagnation of staff numbers
but have also demonstrated that those UNRWA employ-
ees who hold work contracts do so with little to no job
security. In this regard, UNRWA is implementing
policies that have been extensively criticised elsewhere
in the context of livelihood programmes and market
employers who offer vulnerable people exploitative
contracts with few rights (see Jacobsen, 2006).
In effect, on 17 January 2018 UNRWA headquarters
in Amman sent employees an internal Area Staff
Circular noting that, due to the ‘severity of the funding
shortfall’, it was announcing a series of exceptional
measures pertaining to employment across all areas of
UNRWA operation. The Circular announced that
UNRWAwould no longer grant any extension of service
beyond the official age of retirement of sixty (as had
previously been the case). Furthermore, ‘posts that
become vacant due to retirement of Area staff members
are not to be filled until further notice’. It noted that from
18 January 2018, ‘conversion of fixed-term (X) appoint-
ment to indefinite (A) appointment is suspended’.
Moreover: ‘area staff members with ten years of
continuous service as of January 18, 2018 or later, and
eligible for an indefinite appointment, will instead be
considered for extension of their fixed-term appoint-
ment in line with applicable rules and instructions at the
time of the extension’.
The experiences of one of my interviewees17 are
particularly pertinent when tracing the impacts of this
circular onUNRWA employees. This Palestinian teacher
was first employed as a ‘daily’ teacher, and, for the past
8 years, as a fixed-term full-time UNRWA employee.
Since 2011, she has been teaching Palestinian children
from Syria who arrived in Lebanon seeking sanctuary in
her home-camp. She felt acute insecurity for her future
because ‘[i]f my contract is not converted to an indefinite
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one, I will have nothing to support me or my family after
I am 60. As a [fixed term] employee, I would only receive
my own savings (tawfeer) as a lump sum, with no
contribution from UNRWA’.
This is because upon retirement only UNRWA employ-
ees who are on indefinite contracts are eligible to receive
the full Provident Fund lump sum18 (an UNRWA official
termmost Palestinian employees are not familiar with), or
what Palestinians refer to as ta’weed. Ta’weed is the full
compensation that employees receive from UNRWA for
their many years’ service, combining the monthly
contributions that are deducted directly from their
salaries (i.e. their tawfeer) plus an UNRWA contribution.
As UNRWA employees receive no monthly pension after
retirement, without the combined payment this teacher
would effectively only receive her own savings in one lump
sum, which would never be sufficient to support herself
and her family as she grows older.
A few days later, she was partially relieved to receive a
second UNRWA circular by email and in English, which
stated that ‘the Conversion of Fixed-Term to Indefinite
Appointment is reinstated as per previous terms, effec-
tive January 18, 2018’. This seemed to suggest that when
she reaches her tenth year anniversary of working on a
fixed-term basis for UNRWA, her contract could still be
converted to an indefinite one. However, she told me,
having received the devastating news once, she still fears
that UNRWA’s ongoing funding insecurity will mean
that, in the end, she may never be offered an indefinite
contract.19
Such fears appear to have some foundation, as the same
interviewee informed me in a subsequent interview that
she and her colleagues had been dealt another blow:20
UNRWA reportedly informed them in February that, even
if they have been employed for ten years or more,
UNRWA will be unable to pay its direct contribution
to any UNRWA employees due to the funding shortfall.
If this is the case, employees will only receive their
own savings (tawfeer) when they turn sixty, as she and
others will no longer be eligible to receive their full
compensation (ta’weed) upon retirement.While no formal
announcement has been made at the time of writing,
Palestinians’ fears and mistrust must be situated in the
context of their knowledge of UNRWA’s past operational
changes over the course of the agency’s multiple financial
crises, and also in relation to the nature of UNRWA’s
uneven communication with its employees (discussed
below). In this context, Palestinians’ insecurities are linked
simultaneously to actual operational changes, apparent
policy reversals which many people believe cannot be
trusted and sometimes unconfirmed potential changes
that are passed on by word of mouth.
It is certain that all my interviewees and their colleagues
face an insecure future, and, indeed, increasingly difficult
working conditions since all employees will be required to
retire at sixty, and no new recruitments will be made as
posts become vacant due to retirement.21 This means that
when the above-cited teacher’s colleagues retire, no
replacements will be recruited. Already in March 2018
when her colleague was sick, UNRWA did not find a
‘daily-paid’ substitute teacher – instead, her class of thirty-
five students had to ‘absorb’ the other teacher’s class,
leaving her to teach seventy children in her small
classroom.
Such changes also mean that young Palestinians who
had hoped to work for UNRWA – including prospective
teachers, doctors, clerical and facilities staff – will face
restricted employment possibilities, leading to increased
levels of unemployment, underemployment and related
long-term precarity.
It must also be acknowledged that the cessation of
recruitment and the reduction of employee rights in 2018
took place on top of previous reductions in UNRWA
employment conditions, since in 1999 ‘UNRWA salaries
and terms and conditions’ had already been significantly
reduced (Barney 2003:183). In 1999, UNRWA was
already facing ‘difficulty in recruiting and keeping hold
of quality staff’, and by 2016 UNRWA had noted that
‘[w]ith somany of the Agency’s achievements depending
on the direct delivery of services to refugees by individual
staff, building a strong culture of trust, consultation and
respect at all levels in workforce management and staff
relations are of vital importance’ (ibid.; 2017: 60).
Difficulties in recruiting and retaining staff and
‘building a strong culture of trust’ will only increase in
light of ongoing financial pressures and concomitant
organisational reforms.
In particular, as I have argued elsewhere (Fiddian-
Qasmiyeh, 2016a), now that both UN refugee agencies
are physically present in and operating in Palestinian
refugee camps – UNHCR is providing assistance and
protection to all refugees from Syria apart from
Palestinians – camp residents have transformed
‘UNHCR’ into a verb: the camps have been ‘UNHCR-
ised’. Through this process, since 2011many Palestinians
who had originally worked for UNRWA have shifted,
when possible, to UNHCR positions, which are both
more highly paid than UNRWA roles and are perceived
as being more ‘stable’ in light of UNRWA’s repeated
financial crises. With the 2018 cuts, the likelihood of
UNRWA employees seeking alternative forms of
employment continues to increase and retention rates
will decrease. In turn, Palestinian refugees who have until
now provided services to other Palestinians in the camp
through UNRWA are increasingly likely to seek
employment opportunities to support Syrian refugees
throughUNHCR. In a context of increasing funding cuts
writ large, both institutions are struggling to provide36
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meaningful support to the expanding population in the
Palestinian camps in Lebanon, and all refugees –
‘established’ and ‘new’ alike – are suffering in the process.
Miscommunication and Ongoing Fears
As noted above, Palestinians’ experiences of precarity
must be situated in the context of their knowledge of
UNRWA’s past operational changes and also in relation
to the nature of UNRWA’s communication with its
employees. UNRWA itself has previously acknowledged
that the organisation would have to explicitly ‘strengthen
its commitment to transparency, open communication
and dialogue’ as part of the process of attempting to
‘foster higher levels of trust and respect’ (2016: 60).
Alongside my interviewees’ experiences of precarious
employment and pension rights, they also expressed
concerns regarding the lack of transparent and open
communication throughout this period.
One of my interviewees, a diligent UNRWA sanitation
worker who commutes for three hours a day to keep
UNRWA hospital rooms and operating theatres clean
and functioning, explained that he has no email address,
and therefore never receives UNRWA’s circulars.22 As
such, he waited longer than the above-cited teacher for
the ‘revised’ message pertaining to employment and
pension changes to reach him:
Those of us who are employed in the lower grades
don’t receive e-mails, we need UNRWA staff who
are higher up to tell us the news about our jobs and
futures. Not everyone knows what is going on. And,
remember, not everyone working for UNRWA, can
read, including other people who work with me as
cleaners and guards at the hospital. We need to wait
for other colleagues to explain what is going on.
Even employees who are ‘higher up’ find it difficult to
follow UNRWA’s notifications. The head-teacher of an
UNRWA school23 stressed that,
These notifications are always issued in English first.
Sometimes they are translated into Arabic, but not
always. Even when they are translated into Arabic
they always arrive several days after the English
version. Why don’t they arrive at the same time?
Why does the Arabic version sometimes not arrive
at all?
With important messages arriving in complex English
sentences, several of my interviewees noted that they
have never really understood the exact meaning or the
implications of the statements issued by UNRWA.
Furthermore, the head-teacher asked: ‘Why does
UNRWA headquarters always issue several circulars
within two or three days of one another, saying they are
going to do one thing and then changing part of their
decision in the next message? Are they camouflaging
their decisions, or trying to pretend that they are being
kind to us by only withdrawing some of our rights rather
than all of them?’ By issuing two decisions almost
simultaneously, the head-teacher told me, UNRWA
employees often dwell on the first message and overlook
the other, especially if they are depending on other
people to keep them up-to-date. My interviewees,
including those whose concerns are outlined above,
expressed their suspicion that sending many messages in
complex writing might be a purposeful UNRWA strat-
egy: by seeming to reinstate a particular ‘right’ that it had
just withdrawn, they perceived that the Agency might be
aiming to ensure that other, more significant changes,
would pass peacefully and without resistance.24
Indeed, a key theme explored throughout this article
pertains to representation, both in terms of who and
what has been represented or absented in UNRWA’s
campaigns, but also in terms of the disjuncture between
UNRWA’s international and local-level communica-
tions. Ultimately, the #DignityIsPriceless has veiled its
Palestinian staff members’ precarious employment and
pension rights from international audiences via its public
communication strategy, and has in turn poorly trans-
lated (literally and operationally) its strategy to Palesti-
nians on the local level. In this context, significant risks
are being borne both by those Palestinians who rely on
UNRWA-provided services and by UNRWA’s Palesti-
nian employees. Nonetheless, these impacts continue to
be erased from view by a contract and risk-management
culture thatmaintains the primacy of international (read:
non-Palestinian) actors and ideological priorities. In the
context of UNRWA’s institutional adaptation to long-
standing financial crises, a push for cost-efficiency and
the desire to maximise ‘value for money’ (and shift
responsibility for refugees to ‘local’ actors), have all been
characterised by the perpetuation of highly unequal
partnerships; throughout, the continued dominance
of English has played a key role as a mechanism of
exclusion. Such a process is not limited to UNRWA and
Palestinians, but can, instead, be identified as one of
the main challenges faced by ‘local’ partners throughout
the broader process of ‘localisation’ (in the context of
Syria, see Howe et al., 2015; Field, 2016).
An Uncertain Future
Throughout 2018, Palestinians including mothers(to-
be)-and-infants, ‘particularly vulnerable’ social groups,
schoolchildren and UNRWA employees and their fam-
ilies have faced increasing insecurities. This is not just
because the US Administration’s funding cuts mean that
they may be unable to access key UNRWA educational
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and medical services, but also because these services
themselves are ‘shrinking’ and, in many ways, being
‘privatised’. As illustrated in the internal UNRWA
circulars and recent operational changes analysed above,
this can be seen through the reconfiguration of health-
care provision (including changes in maternity care) and
educational systems (resulting in significantly larger
classes). In turn, the reduction of employment and
pension rights is resulting in an unsustainable strain on
service providers and the potential ‘migration’ of
employees, current and future, away from UNRWA.
Nonetheless, while justified through reference to the
‘severity of the funding shortfall’, the reduction of
services must be viewed as part of a broader historical
trend in defunding and shrinking UNRWA, and in
conjunction with the incremental restriction of Palesti-
nians’ employment and pension rights. In spite of the
partial financial ‘successes’ of the #DignityIsPriceless
campaign and UNRWA’s pledging conferences, the US
Administration’s total withdrawal of support at the end
of August 2018 means that UNRWA is invariably
navigating its course towards major structural reforms.
There can be no doubt that these will have significantly
negative impacts on services and employment rights
alike, further undermining the wellbeing and futures
both of ‘vulnerable’ refugees who are hypervisible on the
international stage, and ‘agentic’ refugees who remain on
the margins. In this context, UNRWA’s Palestinian
employees – in many ways the epitome of the figure of
the self-reliant refugee – have been rendered invisible
from international campaigns while being implored to
work and continue serving the members of their refugee
community with little to no job security.
It is, of course, essential to acknowledge the highly
challenging context in which UNRWA headquarters is
attempting to balance the lack of financial resources with
the need to provide ‘relief and works’ for Palestinian
refugees, while also recognising the extent to which
UNRWA has, since its inception, always already been in
the midst of a financial crisis. In effect, in the absence of a
fair and just political resolution to the occupation of the
Palestinian territories and the implementation of existing
legal frameworks to uphold Palestinian refugees’ rights,
UNRWA has few options available. Two such options
have been outlined above: firstly, seeking to diversify its
funding sources, as embodied in the #DignityIsPriceless
campaign and, secondly, to continue reducing services
and employment rights. Following the US’s decision to
defund UNRWA, two further options are being con-
sidered and promoted in the international arena: securing
funding for health and hardship cases but expecting
Middle Eastern host countries to provide basic education,
or taking steps to redefine Palestinians’ refugee status.
The latter, which is currently being advocated by the US
Administration, would significantly reduce the number
of people entitled to UNRWA services and has been seen
as a dangerous precursor to further denying Palestinians’
access to core political and legal rights, including the
Right of Return and the right to collective self-determi-
nation. While these last two options would never be
accepted by Middle Eastern states due to the economic
and political implications, and while Palestinians’ refugee
status cannot – in fact – be stripped by either the US or
UNRWA since it is defined and protected in international
law and UN Resolutions (Akram, 2018), it is equally the
case that throughout 2018 the first two options created
grave insecurities on the local level.
As noted by my interviewees, UNRWA’s employees
are both vocally and silently questioning the Agency’s
ability, or desire, to uphold its obligations towards
Palestinian refugees. The decline in UNRWA services
thus echoes the decline of UNRWA’s image in the mind
of many refugees themselves, as the position of UNRWA
as ‘the provider’ of services and assistance has been
undermined through UNRWA’s selective prioritisation
and programmatic reconfigurations in times of crisis.
A set of particularly urgent questions arise in the
context of the US’s financial cuts – and more recent
defunding – and UNRWA’s responses to its precarious
financial situation in 2018. These include, firstly, exam-
ining the implications of internationally declaring an
institutional commitment to keeping services active,
while undermining the quality and reach of these
services on the local level. And, secondly, identifying
the risks of promoting a public semblance of funding
drives enabling UNRWA to continue ‘work as usual’
while, on the local level, Palestinian refugees’ rights are
being increasingly eroded and undermined, both as
service beneficiaries and as providers. In turn, as we
consider the short- and long-term implications of
Palestinians’ experiences of the events unfolding in
2018, further analysesmust consider how the localisation
of aid agenda can uphold, rather than undermine, the
rights of refugees and local citizens working to support
refugees. Indeed, as the international community
increasingly promotes localisation and self-reliance, it
remains to be seen how (and by whom) fair remuner-
ation schemes can be monitored on the local level and
precisely whose responsibility it should be to ensure that
salaries are paid and rights – including pension rights –
are protected in the short-, medium- and long-terms.
While political solutions are pending, it is essential that
appropriate steps are taken to ensure that people affected
by displacement are not rendered responsible for risks
created by international systems or forced to carry
insecurities throughout their and their families’ lives –
lives which are likely to be characterised by ongoing
processes of overlapping displacement.38
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Notes
1 This article draws on research generously funded
by UK’s AHRC and ESRC (Grant Ref. AH/P005438/
1 – see www.refugeehosts.org). Thanks are due to Yousif
M. Qasmiyeh, Estella Carpi, Juliano Fiori and the
article’s two anonymous reviewers for their helpful
feedback on earlier iterations.
2 See UNRWA (2018c).
3 The cuts and demands for reform were welcomed by some,
including selected Israeli politicians and media, who echoed
Kuschner’s claims of corruption and of UNRWA’s very
existence perpetuating the conflict (cited in Lynch and
Gramer, 2018). However, many other Israeli and non-
Israeli commentators have remained highly critical of the
human and security implications of the cuts for Palestinians
and the Middle East (Bachner, 2018; Levy, 2018).
4 The US Administration has declared its plans to ‘strip
[millions of] Palestinians of their refugee status’ (Lynch
and Gramer, 2018). See Akram (2018) for a refutation of
the assumption that reducing the number of UNRWA
beneficiaries would erase Palestinians’ Right of Return
(also Roy, 2018).
5 While UNRWA has established numerous Emergency
Appeals to support Palestinians affected by diverse conflicts
within the region over the past decade, it could be argued
that it is the ongoing conflict in Syria, and its effects on
Palestinians within and displaced from that country, that
has led to the dramatic deterioration of UNRWA’s capacity
to provide assistance and protection to Palestinians (Y.M.
Qasmiyeh, personal communication, 15 September 2018).
6 See www.refugeehosts.org.
7 For critical engagements with the concept, policy and
practice of ‘self-reliance’, see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2015),
Fiori and Rigon (2017) and Easton-Calabria and Omata
(2018).
8 Palestinians have often been highly critical and wary of the
UNRWA’s role, intentions and implications, including
rejecting it as a Eurocentric institution which censors
Palestinian history, politics and priorities under the guise of
‘neutrality’ (personal observations, Lebanon, 2007–18 pas-
sim; E. Carpi, personal communication, 16 August 2018).
9 For an evaluation of donor trends and their implications
on UNRWA services through to the early 2000s, see
Brynen (2003).
10 UNRWA (n.d.a).
11 UNRWA (2018c).
12 Such decisions, as noted by one of this article’s
anonymous reviewers, are not merely underpinned by a
desire to save costs but also by a dominant ideology
within the humanitarian sector, which prioritises cost-
efficiency, value for money and steps to reduce refugees’
dependency on aid (and, of course, international actors’
responsibilities towards refugees).
13 Anonymous interview, 4 April 2018.
14 Anonymous interview, 6 April 2018.
15 It is notable that Palestinian refugees used to rely on the
expertise of midwives, usually older or elderly women
whose knowledge of childbirth enabled them to support
other women throughout pregnancy and delivery (typi-
cally homebirths). In the 1980s, UNRWA provided
professionally trained medical staff to join midwives in
deliveries, supplementing traditional knowledge with
formal training (Y.M. Qasmiyeh, personal communi-
cation, 5 June 2018). The increasing medicalisation of
childbirth, including through UNRWA hospitals, led
both to the dilution of midwives’ practice, and the
expectation of UNRWA support for childbirth.
UNRWA’s provision and subsequent withdrawal of
‘delivery services’ mean that local responses may no
longer be as viable as they were in the 1980s and yet may
require a major resurgence as refugees step in to fill a gap
created by the international community.
16 Earlier versions of two sections of this article appeared in
Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2018a and b).
17 Anonymous interview, 20 January 2018.
18 On the Provident Fund, see UNRWA (2017a).
19 Anonymous interview, 28 January 2018.
20 Anonymous interview, 2 February 2018.
21 At the end of September 2018, two interviewees
informed me that Palestinian employees over the age of
forty were being ‘invited’ by UNRWA to request
voluntary early retirement; their positions would not be
filled through new appointments.
22 Anonymous interview, 14 February 2018. As noted by
one of the article’s anonymous reviewers, technology can
reinforce privilege and forms of exclusion, rather than
facilitating participation and equality of access to services
and modes of communication; while beyond the scope of
this paper, such processes are of course highly gendered
(see Madianou et al., 2015).
23 Anonymous interview, 15 February 2018.
24 This process can in turn be fruitfully be considered
alongside UNRWA’s interpellation of actual service cuts
in the fields of maternal and neonatal health, as not really
being cuts but rather a ‘return to normal’.
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